Security · side-by-side

How Frendy compares to other messengers

A side-by-side look at Frendy and other privacy-focused messengers across the security properties that matter. Competitor data comes from public documentation and reflects our understanding at the time of writing — corrections are welcome. The Frendy row shows its current state (some properties activate after client rollout and deployment).

About this comparison. The rows for other apps are a good-faith summary based on publicly available documentation, verified as of 25 July 2026, simplified to yes / partial / no — three symbols can't capture every nuance, and features change over time. This is not a statement that any other product is insecure. All product names, logos and trademarks are the property of their respective owners and are used here only to identify the products (nominative use); no affiliation or endorsement is implied. If you believe a cell is inaccurate, tell us via frendy.im and we'll review and correct it.

✓ Yes ~ Partial / with a caveat ✕ No 15 messengers × 11 properties · scroll table sideways →

Messenger	E2EE by default	Forward Secrecy	Post- quantum	No phone number	Minimal metadata	2FA	Duress PIN	Encrypted at rest	Self- host	E2EE calls / confs	Open source
Frendy	✓	✓DR+PQXDH	✓Kyber	✓login+seed	✓	✓TOTP	✓duress	✓SQLCipher	~possible	✓+confs	✕
SimpleX	✓	✓	✓PQ	✓no IDs	✓	~	✓self-destruct	✓	✓SMP	~1:1	✓
Threema	✓	✓Ibex	✕	✓Threema ID	✓	✓	✕	✓	~OnPrem	✓	✓
Olvid	✓	✓	✕	✓no server ID	✓no directory	✓	✕	✓	~	✓	✓
Signal	✓	✓	✓PQXDH	✕needs №	✓sealed	✓PIN	✕	✓	✕	✓	✓
Element / Matrix	~DM on	✓Megolm	✕	✓Matrix ID	~federation	✓	✕	✓	✓flagship	✓	✓
Wire	✓	✓MLS	✕	~email	~	✓	✕	✓	✓enterprise	✓	✓
Briar	✓	✓	✕	✓	✓P2P/Tor	✕	✕	✓	✓P2P	✕no calls	✓
iMessage	✓	✓PQ3	✓PQ3	~AppleID	~	✓	✕	✓	✕	✓FaceTime	✕
Session	✓	✕no DR	✕	✓account ID	✓onion	✕	✕	✓	~nodes	~	✓
WhatsApp	✓	✓	✕	✕	✕Meta	✓	✕	~	✕	✓	✕
FB Messenger	✓since 2023	✓	✕	✕	✕Meta	~	✕	~	✕	✓	✕
Viber	✓	✓	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	~	✕	✓	✕
Telegram	✕secret only	~secret	✕	✕	✕	✓	✕	✕cloud	✕	~1:1	~client
Google Messages (RCS)	~1:1 only	✓	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	~	✕	✕	✕

Sorted by number of implemented security properties — not by popularity or user count.

Where Frendy is strong

rare combo

No phone + Forward Secrecy + post-quantum

Sign up by username and seed phrase (not a number) — like Threema/Session/Olvid. But they lack post-quantum, and Signal (with PQ) requires a number. The "no number + DR + PQXDH" combination is very rare.

near-unique

E2EE avatars

The server holds avatars as ciphertext only — decrypted on the client. Mainstream messengers keep avatars in plaintext. A real metadata-privacy differentiator.

anti-coercion

Duress PIN

A second PIN instantly wipes data and revokes the session. Almost nobody on the list has it — a strong argument for at-risk users.

full stack

E2EE calls AND conferences + at-rest

Group video conferences with E2EE (not just 1:1), plus full local-storage encryption (SQLCipher) and TOTP 2FA — all in one, cross-platform.

Where Frendy still trails — honestly

trust

Not open-source

Signal, Threema, Session, Wire, Element, Briar, Olvid publish source, allowing independent crypto review. Frendy's code is closed: trust rests on the whitepaper and (planned) external audit.

verification

No independent audit yet

Leaders have public audits (Cure53 et al.). For Frendy that's the next step toward comparable trust; currently there is an internal audit and this whitepaper.

infrastructure

Self-host is "possible", not turnkey

Matrix/Wire/Briar make self-hosting a headline feature. For Frendy it's achievable but not packaged as a product yet.